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Interpretations of Karl Marx’s critical theory often diverge sharply on the question of subjectivity. This stems from how theories of selfhood intersect with contested aspects of Marx’s work, including human nature, alienation, the structure–agency relationship, and the revolutionary subject’s identity. Since the publication of Postone’s Time, Labor, and Social Domination, a central interpretive question has emerged: does Marx theorize the proletariat as the agent of historical change—and the revolutionary subject—or is capital itself the subject?
I argue that Marx’s critical theory operates with a relational conception of subjectivity at its core. As noted by Étienne Balibar, Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism reveals how social relations in the (seemingly) objective world mold human selfhood. Simultaneously, Marx emphasizes how human agents shape their material world and social relations, postulating a theory of malleable selfhood as the linchpin in his critique of political economy. Most prominently in Marx’s discussion of Primitive Accumulation, he implies that by treating proletarian and bourgeois subjectivities as ahistorical universals, rather than historically contingent, bourgeois political economy fetishizes personhood as it does commodities.
This paper aims to synthesize Postone’s and Lukács’ interpretations of Marx. Capital presents capital as a Geist-esque subject-object: an impersonal, self-valorizing force. Yet Marx also posits the proletariat’s potential as a self-conscious revolutionary subject. For Marx, I argue the core contradiction of capitalism lies in the tension between these two forms of subjectivity: capital as an alien power, and the proletariat as conscious, revolutionary agents capable of seizing the freedom capitalism potentializes, yet withholds.