Is Good Health a Moral Achievement?

• In Event: Terminology, Rhetoric, and Influence: Aristotle and Plato

Abstract

There are several questions one might ask concerning the relationship between physical health and moral virtue. We could evaluate whether good health is a consequence of virtue. We could approach this question by investigating the physical wellness of those who live lives that are broadly excellent. Or we could examine the impact of particular virtues (e.g., temperance or wittiness) or vices (e.g., rashness or irascibility) on health outcomes, drawing on empirical work when available. Alternatively, we might investigate whether good health is a precondition for a virtuous life. Since Aristotle describes virtue as acquired in a mature person, not the young—and because he specifies that a good life must not be tragically short—it seems that a baseline of health is required to grow in virtue. Another fruitful inquiry would be to investigate different forms of privilege (e.g., parenting, wealth, or leisure) that can support both good health and good character.

This paper assesses the connection between moral virtue and physical wellness from an Aristotelian framework, investigating whether we ought to consider good health a moral achievement. It contends that, while virtue has nontrivial impacts on health and vitality, sometimes in surprising ways, good health is neither moral nor an achievement, and here are many cases in which moral virtue and physical health diverge.

Author

• Sabrina Little, Ohio State University