Perceptions of Government Performance and Support for State Constitutional Conventions

• In Event: Trust and Confidence in Government

Abstract

This paper examines how risk calculations and perceptions of government performance affect the public’s favorability to constitutional change. Fourteen states automatically schedule a referendum every 10-22 years asking citizens whether they wish to call a new state constitutional convention. We analyze pre-election polls in two of these states, Rhode Island and New York.

Our theory of constitutional renegotiation seeks to explain when and why voters will are willing to try constitutional reform. When the status quo seems desirable, voters weigh constitutional change against loss aversion. In these situations, voters who view the economy as strong enough to handle constitutional experimentation may overcome their status quo bias. When the status quo seems unacceptable, voters may consider constitutional change as a means to hold government officials accountable for poor performance. Economic perceptions serve as a traditional performance heuristic in this context.

A preliminary analysis provides support for our theory. Rhode Islanders considered a constitutional convention in 2014 as their state lagged behind the rest of the nation according to objective economic indicators. Voters with negative economic perceptions were significantly more likely to favor a convention, and this effect was concentrated among voters who also had negative perceptions of Rhode Island’s governance. New York’s convention referendum took place in 2017 when state unemployment and economic growth were close to the national average. Here, positive economic perceptions increased the likelihood of New York voters supporting a convention, and this effect was concentrated among voters with positive governance attitudes.

Authors

• William Blake, University of Maryland, Baltimore County

• Ian Anson, UMBC