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1-082 - Signature limits in implicit theory of mind: Evidence for two systems of mindreading?

Thu, March 19, 12:15 to 1:45pm, Marriott, Floor: Level 4, Franklin Hall 2

Session Type: Paper Symposium

Integrative Statement

The biggest puzzles in current theory of mind (ToM) research is how to square the findings from decades of explicit standard false belief and related tasks –indicating competence from around age 4- with the growing body of evidence for nascent ToM in implicit tasks even in infants. One recent response is a two-systems-account holding that the different sets of findings reflect the workings of different cognitive systems (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009): System 1 for minimal mindreading develops early, and functions efficiently yet inflexibly. System 2, in contrast, develops later, works flexibly and depends on language and general cognitive resource such as executive function.
But how can this account be tested against alternatives, in particular nativist 1-system-accounts (Carruthers, 2013)? Crucially, the two hypothesized systems differ in their conceptual repertoire: System 1 enables the tracking of simple psychological relations, but does not allow the ascription of full-blown propositional attitudes such as beliefs that System 2 supports. In particular, System 1 has clear signature limits in that it lacks resources to represent the aspectuality of beliefs and other propositional attitudes.
The papers in this symposium focus on these signature limits as empirical test case for the two-systems-account against alternative theories. Presentation 1 will lay out the theoretical foundations and predictions of the account in precise and detailed ways. Presentations 2-4 will present new empirical evidence with infants, children and adults that make a strong case for the predicted signature limits of implicit mindreading in various types of tasks, and thus for the two-systems-account.

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