.05). Even in the “Teller vs. Prosocial” condition, wherein the Prosocial agent both told a name and informed children of a positive experience, they were not drawn to her over a simple Teller. We also assessed parent authoritarianism (Feldman & Stenner, 1997), which correlated with children’s tendency to attribute knowledge to the speaker who offered non-epistemic reasons, r(106)=-.24, p=.01. These results suggest a conceptual distinction, present in childhood, between practical and epistemic reasons. Children privilege epistemic reasons for forming new beliefs, particularly in contrast to speakers who state what they want the child to believe. Children of more authoritarian parents were more willing to attribute knowledge to speakers who made non-epistemic appeals for belief, suggesting important aspects of the environment that influence children’s belief formation. Content is hosted by All Academic Inc, a leading provider of online hosting and software solutions for academic conferences supporting submission, peer review, scheduling, invitaions, volunteers, scheduling, web-based programs, advanced bulk email, custom workflows, and more for conferences of scholarly societies since 1999." />
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Poster #223 - The Will to Believe: Children Distinguish Practical and Epistemic Reasons for Belief

Thu, April 6, 11:45am to 1:00pm, Austin Convention Center, Exhibit Hall 4

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