Poster #39 - Does Executive Function Predict Future Thinking When Present and Future Conflict?

• In Event: 1-005 - Poster Session 01
  In Poster Session: PS 01 Section - Cognitive Processes

Integrative Statement

Thinking about one’s own future (or “episodic future thinking”; Atance & O’Neill, 2001) is central to human cognition (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997). Developmental researchers have used various behavioral methods to study this capacity in young children. For example, Atance et al. (2015) brought 3- to 5-year-olds to two rooms. In one room, they played with toys, whereas in the other, no toys were available. Children were then told that they would be returning to the rooms in the future and were asked where they would like to store extra toys. Whereas 4- and 5-year-olds were above chance in deciding to place the toys in the correct “no-toy” room, 3-year-olds were not, suggesting that only the older preschoolers were thinking ahead about where toys would be needed. In the current study, we implemented a more difficult version of this task: 46 4- and 5-year-olds were taken into one room where there was candy to eat and into another room with no candy. Children were told they would be visiting the rooms again tomorrow but, importantly, were also told that a garbage man would be cleaning that night and would throw out any candy he found in the “no-candy” room. Participants were then asked where they would like to store new candy for their visit tomorrow. What differentiates this task from Atance et al.’s is that children must think about a future state of the world that differs from the present. Indeed, if children are reasoning based on the present, they will incorrectly choose to place the candy in the “no-candy” room. However, if they are reasoning based on the future (and taking the garbage man’s visit into account), they should select the “candy” room (even though it currently contains candy). We also explored whether those children who have more developed cognitive flexibility and working memory abilities might also be the ones who succeed on this task. Working memory may be necessary to keep in mind and recombine the various key pieces of information (e.g., the garbage man visits at night), whereas cognitive flexibility may allow children to consider a future that is markedly different from the present (i.e., whereas the “no-candy” room currently has no candy, it is better to place candy for tomorrow in the “candy” room). Unlike in Atance et al. where 4- and 5-year-olds succeeded, in this more difficult version, children’s performance was no different from chance (39% and 48%, respectively, binomial test ps > .405). In addition, although working memory (backward digit span, count and label) increased significantly with age, t(23 .24) = 2.62, p = .015, d = .88, scores on these tasks and cognitive flexibility (DCCS) were unrelated to children’s performance on our future thinking task. Our results highlight that tasks that require children to explicitly consider how present and future differ are particularly challenging. Future directions include testing older children and further exploring the cognitive mechanisms that underlie this more advanced form of future-oriented reasoning.

Authors

• Kathleen Cassidy, University of Ottawa
  Presenting Author

• Hana Ziani-Bey, University of Ottawa
  Non-Presenting Author

• Julian Caza, University of Ottawa
  Non-Presenting Author

• Cristina M. Atance, University of Ottawa
  Non-Presenting Author