Children’s Causal Reasoning and Explanations for Why Improbable and Impossible Events Can/Cannot Occur Across Domains

• In Event: 3-081 - The Emergence of Causal Reasoning and Causal Explanations in Childhood: Diverse Definitions and Methodologies

Integrative Statement

Previous research indicates that children can differentiate between possible and impossible events by the preschool years, but have a harder time correctly identifying improbable events as possible (Shtulman & Carey, 2007). Similarly, although adults easily identify impossible events, they may be willing to endorse some impossible events as “more plausible” than other (Shtulman & Morgan, 2017). These judgments may be related to the type of causal mechanism individuals use to explain why an event could or could not occur – whether it be natural (creating an invention), religious (asking God), or supernatural (using a magic wand) (Legare, Evans, Rosengren, & Harris, 2012). Alternatively, it may also be a result of the domain of the event – biological (growth), psychological (knowledge), or physical (e.g., conservation) (Shtulman, 2009) – as supernatural explanations may increase with age in certain domains (Legare et al., 2012). Two studies examined the types of causal explanations adults and children give when explaining why biological-, psychological-, or physical-based events could/could not occur.
Study 1: Adults (Mean-Age = 19.51, N = 326) from four religious affiliations (Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Non-Affiliated) were asked if a supernatural causal mechanism (God) could make 6 biological, psychological, or physical impossible events happen in real life and why/why not. Explanations were coded as natural (“GMOs can”), religious supernatural (“praying to God”), non-religious supernatural (“using magic”), co-existing (natural + religious supernatural; natural + non-religious supernatural), irrelevant (“cows moo”), or don’t know (adapted from Legare et al., 2012).
Religious-based explanations were given more frequently than natural-based explanations across domains, but very few co-existing explanations were given (see Table 1). Moreover, natural-based explanations were seldom given for the psychological-domain, suggesting there may be domain differences in how individuals conceptualize causality (Shtulman & Morgan, 2017).
Study 2: Children between 4.57- and 7.58-years-old (Mean-Age = 6.08; N = 76) from four religious affiliations (Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Non-Affiliated) were first asked if 12 events (6-improbable, 6-impossible; 3 domains: biological, psychological, physical) could happen in real life and to explain why/why not. Then, children were presented with the same events and asked if a supernatural causal mechanism (God) could make the events happen in real life and explain why/why not. Children’s explanations were coded with the same coding scheme from Study 1.
Children gave more natural-based explanations for improbable and impossible events across all three domains for the events in which no cause was provided. However, they changed to giving an equal number of natural-based and religious-based explanations when provided with a religious supernatural cause (God). This change in explanation type (predominately natural to half-natural, half-religious) is likely a result of providing a religious cause to the child. However, it also demonstrates children reason about supernatural causes at a young age.
In sum, the types of causal explanations adults and children give when confronted with improbable or impossible events varies slightly across domains. Moreover, young children may only use supernatural explanations when the context primes for it instead of spontaneously providing these types of explanations on their own.

Authors

• Kirsten A Lesage, University of California, Riverside
  Presenting Author

• Rebekah Ann Richert, University of California, Riverside
  Non-Presenting Author