Poster #207 - Lay Beliefs on Thought Validation using Metacognition Contribute to Self-Concept and Emotion Management in Adolescence

• In Event: 3-053 - Poster Session 10
  In Poster Session: PS 10 Section - Social, Emotional, Personality

Integrative Statement

Current models of self-concept draw analogies to “attitude strength” literature, where “strongly” held self-views (regardless of valence or extremity) are treated as more certain, important, and personally-relevant; they are thus more likely to influence behavior and resist being changed. A strongly-held negative self-concept may be particularly harmful, and be a potent promotor of depression (DeMarree, Petty & Brinol, 2007), consistent with current developmental psychopathology models (Orth & Robins, 2013).

Appraisals of the validity/diagnosticity of potentially self-relevant thoughts and feelings may be a key input to self-concept certainty and strength. Individuals may use metacognitive cues attached to thoughts and feelings such as their perceived intensity, frequency, intrusiveness, or resistance to change, to inform such judgments. However, whether or how particular metacognitive cues are used may strongly depend on individuals’ lay theories about the meaning of such cues (Rucker, Tormala, Petty, & Briñol, 2014).

Recent theories on emotion regulation similarly focus on appraisal of the inputs to emotions, including judgments of the certainty of their meaning (Roseman, 2013), may influence which emotions are even felt. These appraisals can guide selection of effective regulatory strategies (Yih, Uusberg, Taxer, & Gross, 2018), for instance ruminating on emotions reflecting truly important situations, while reappraising only when the emotions reflect a less strong assessment (Scheppes et al., 2014).

Our research explores the possibility that varying lay beliefs about metacognitive cues may influence individuals’ “calibration” on self-concept and emotion regulation decisions, particularly in adolescence. Self-concept development is critical in adolescence (Steiger, Allemand, Robins, & Fend, 2014; Trzesniewski et al., 2006), but occurs amid a novel, complex, and challenging backdrop of affect and cognition brought on by changes during this period (Galvan, 2017). Adolescents who tend to strongly validate negative affect and cognition in this environment may show a less resilient self-concept, poorer mental health, and less effective emotion regulation. In a multi-school study of 9th grade students (n = 203), we measured beliefs regarding whether metacognitive characteristics such as the intensity, frequency, intrusiveness, or persistence of self-directed thoughts and feelings were cues as to those thoughts/feelings validity and self-diagnosticity. Agreement robustly and substantially predicted lower self-esteem (r = -.18, p = .009), reflecting reduced resilience. Lay beliefs also interacted with self-esteem (ßint = -.14, p = .002) to predict depression, only when self-esteem was low. Daily diary assessments from the same sample provided evidence of less effective emotion regulation, stronger belief in the use of metacognitive cues influences the influence of daily sadness on subsequent day sadness (ßint = .06, p = .026), while simultaneously influencing showing greater negative influence on subsequent day self-attitudes (ßint = -.11, p = .016).

Drawing on the underlying dual-process models of thought and attitude validation (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Petty, Briñol, & DeMarree, 2007), ongoing work with this sample will examine whether these beliefs influence only explicit self-propositions or if they strengthen implicit self-concept as well, measured with the SRET (Dainer-Best, Lee, Shumake, Yeager, & Beevers, 2017).

Lay beliefs guiding thought-negotiation processes may be an important aspect of understanding self-concept research going forward.

Authors

• Joseph Michael O'Brien, University of Texas at Austin
  Presenting Author

• Michael C Mullarkey, The University of Texas at Austin
  Non-Presenting Author

• Mallory Dobias, University of Texas at Austin
  Non-Presenting Author

• David S. Yeager, University of Texas at Austin
  Non-Presenting Author