3-210 - Game Theory in the Playground: The Development of Cooperative Problem-Solving in Children

Session Type: Paper Symposium

Integrative Statement

Cooperation presents humans with a range of complex problems, which must be solved in order for cooperation to persist. Many of these problems can be characterized by social dilemmas, situations in which a conflict exists between self- and group interest. While social dilemmas have been extensively studied in adults, relatively little work has focused on children’s solutions to cooperative dilemmas. Addressing this question can offer insight into how humans solve these dilemmas prior to extensive exposure to explicit societal rules governing cooperation, showcasing a surprisingly neglected aspect of children’s social cognitive development.

In this symposium, we bring together four presentations that employ different, yet complementary, approaches to explore how children resolve social dilemmas. Presentation 1 examines young children’s expectations of how the spoils of cooperative effort ought to be divided, showing increased intervention when unfairness occurs after collaborative versus individual work. Presentation 2 shows that young children have an understanding of mutual benefit, an understanding that is foundational to cooperative relationships. Presentations 3 and 4 examine children’s behavior in a classic cooperative dilemma, the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, asking whether children are more likely to cooperate in the game when (a) they are able to communicate, and (b) they are paired with an ingroup versus outgroup member (Presentation 3), and exploring their reasoning about others’ motives as well as their own cooperative strategies (Presentation 4). Together, these studies show that, from early in development, children show surprising sophistication in their expectations, reasoning and behavior in the face of cooperative dilemmas.

Sub Unit

• Social Cognition

Chairs

• Laurent Prétôt, Boston College

• Katherine McAuliffe, Boston College

Individual Presentations

• Collaboration Increases Third Party Punishment of Inequity in Young Children - Presenting Author: John Corbit, Saint Francis Xavier University

• Expectations of Mutual Benefit Facilitate Children’s Coordination in a Conflict of Interest - Presenting Author: Sebastian Grueneisen, University of Michigan; Non-Presenting Author: Michael Tomasello, Duke University

• Social Influences on Children’s Cooperative Behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma - Presenting Author: Laurent Prétôt, Boston College; Non-Presenting Author: Quinlan Taylor, Boston College; Non-Presenting Author: Katherine McAuliffe, Boston College

• Children’s Motivations and Strategies in a Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma - Non-Presenting Author: Meia Chita-Tegmark, Boston University; Presenting Author: Peter R Blake, Boston University