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A wide literature has demonstrated children’s “essentialist” reasoning, or intuitive tendency to construe observed intergroup differences as reflecting groups’ intrinsic natures. However, little research has explored children’s “structural” reasoning, or capacity to construe observed intergroup differences as reflecting groups’ extrinsic circumstances, resources, or access to opportunities. Structural reasoning may enable children to causally account for observed disparities while avoiding the essentialist inferences that drive prejudice (see Rhodes & Mandalaywala, 2017 for review). In the present studies, we investigated the development, nature, and consequences of structural reasoning about novel social status disparities.
In two studies (Study 1 N = 106 five- and six-year-olds; Study 2 N = 315, including 105 five- and six-year-olds, 105 nine- and ten-year-olds, and 105 adults), we presented participants with novel social status disparities that could be rationally attributed to either essential causes (e.g., a group’s intrinsic ability) or structural causes (e.g., a group’s extrinsic advantage). To manipulate participants’ attributions, we verbally framed the status disparities in either intrinsic, neutral, or extrinsic terms in three between-subjects conditions. We then assessed participants’ essentialist/structural attributions for the disparity (using two measures: explanations and interventions), and finally, their social preferences (using friendship ratings of the high- and low-status groups). We investigated (1) the impacts of age and framing on essentialist/structural attributions, (2) relations between the two attribution measures, explanations and interventions, and (3) whether participants’ attributions for disparities predicted their social preferences.
Results of both studies indicated that both age and verbal framing impacted participants’ attributions (see Figure 1). Framing disparities in extrinsic terms promoted structural attributions (Study 1 p<.001; Study 2 p<.001), and attributions became more structural over development (Study 1 p=.001; Study 2 p<.001). Previous research has found developmental increases in structural explanations for gender disparities (Vasilyeva et al., 2018); by extending this finding to novel disparities, we demonstrate that these developmental shifts reflect shifts in attributional biases themselves, rather than shifts in participants’ knowledge of particular disparities.
We also examined relations between our two attribution measures, explanations (responses to “Why did that kind win?”) and interventions (responses to “What could be different so the other kind could win?” reflecting participants’ social change strategies). Explanations and interventions were highly correlated across all age groups (all ps<.003) and related to the same predictors (age and framing). However, explanations were consistently more essentialist than interventions (all ps<.001). In other words, although participants understood that different structures would yield a different status disparity, they nevertheless viewed the status disparities as explained by essential causes.
Finally, results of both studies indicated that structural attributions for status disparities predicted reduced preferences for high-status groups, relative to essentialist attributions (Study 1 p=.03; Study 2 younger children p=.03, older children p=.001, adults p=.009; see Figure 2). When attributing disparities to groups’ essential strengths/weaknesses, participants preferred the high-status group; however, when attributing disparities to groups’ structural advantages/disadvantages, participants showed no such preference.
In sum, results demonstrate that developmental shifts, along with extrinsic verbal framing, support structural explanations and structural change strategies, improving attitudes toward disadvantaged groups.