The Role of Effort and Outcome on Third-party Resource Distributions

• In Event: Poster Session 02
  In Poster Session: PS 02 Topic - Moral Development

Abstract

By the age of three, when given the opportunity to distribute resources in third-party allocation tasks, children distribute resources equally (Smith, Blake, & Harris, 2013). However, when determining how to fairly distribute rewards between two people who performed identical tasks, merit is important. Indeed, previous research suggests that children take merit into account in the preschool years and that by age 6, they distribute rewards based on deservingness, or equity, rather than equality. Two factors that affect merit are outcome, or how much one has contributed to a task (Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012; Olejnik, 1976) and effort, or how hard someone worked (Hamman, Bender, & Tomasello, 2014). While these two constructs have been examined individually, it is unclear if one holds more weight than the other when children engage in fair distributions. In the real world, it is common for people to be advantaged or disadvantaged relative to others, thus yielding different amounts of work. The current study aims to examine if output or effort is more deserving of rewards in a joint task, or if they are both considered simultaneously.

We will recruit a sample of 32 six-year-old, 32 seven-year-old, and 32 8-year-old children. Children will be shown a series of vignettes manipulating two characters’ effort and contribution to a joint task in a within-subjects design across four conditions: equal effort and equal output, equal effort and different output, different effort and equal output, different effort and different output. For each condition, children will be asked how rewards should be distributed between the two characters (Character A more, Character B more, equal split) and why. We will conduct a 3 (Age group) by 3 (Distribution choice) chi-square analysis for each condition to determine if there are age-related differences between how resources are distributed, and in particular, if the distributions are based on equality or equity. We predict that when effort and outcome are held constant, participants in all age groups will distribute rewards equally. However, when outcome is manipulated, we expect participants in all age groups to distribute more rewards to the character who contributed more to the task. Likewise, when effort is manipulated, we expect participants, especially in the older age groups, to distribute more rewards to the character who worked harder; younger participants might still focus on the outcome and distribute the rewards evenly. Finally, when manipulating both effort and outcome, we expect older participants to recalibrate based on both effort and outcome, distributing the rewards evenly; younger participants might still rely on outcome only.

This study has implications for children’s understanding of social advantages and their effect on task contributions, which in turn, has implications for their understanding of social disparities beyond reward allocation. We are currently (at time of abstract submission) collecting pilot data and will preregister the study. In another online study conducted in our lab with a similar structure, we ran 52 participants in 3.5 months, so we are confident that we will complete data collection, coding, and analysis before the 2021 conference.

Authors

• Emily Kim, University of Toronto
  Presenting Author

• Vanessa Lobue, Rutgers University
  Non-Presenting Author

• Gretchen A Van De Walle, Rutgers University
  Non-Presenting Author