Epistemic Vigilance in Early Childhood: The Role of Nonverbal Behavior in Children’s Decisions of Trust

• In Event: Cultural Transmission of Information: Evidence of Epistemic Vigilance Across Children, Adults, and Non-human Informants

Abstract

Practicing epistemic vigilance protects us from forming false beliefs based on what other people tell us. It involves a) taking a critical stance towards the information we receive and b) paying special attention to cues that suggest deception or misinformation (Mills, 2012). For children, who acquire much of their knowledge through the testimony of other people, epistemic vigilance is immensely useful. Vigilance helps children detect inferior sources of information (e.g., speakers who lack relevant knowledge) as well as deceptive sources of information (e.g., someone who is intentionally misleading). Ample research has demonstrated children’s ability to preferentially trust some speakers over others (see e.g., Corriveau & Harris, 2009a, 2009b; Fusaro, Corriveau, & Harris, 2011; Sobel & Macris, 2013; Harris, Koenig, Corriveau, & Jaswal, 2018). By contrast, empirical work specifically examining children’s vigilance toward deceptive others is limited.

This study examines the development of children’s ability to modulate their trust in verbal testimony as a function of nonverbal behavior. Participants included 26 4-year-olds (M=4.3 years, 13 female), 29 5-year-olds (M=5.5, 17 female), and 28 6-year-olds (M=6.6, 10 female) who watched a series of 12 videos in which an adult provided verbal and nonverbal cues about the location of the toy. In the test trials, the adult provided verbal testimony about the location of the toy, but exhibited nonverbal cues that were inconsistent with their verbal statement. In the control trials, the adult’s verbal testimony was consistent with their nonverbal behaviors. Two additional types of control trials were included in which the adult offered either verbal or nonverbal testimony exclusively. After each video, children were asked to decide where the toy was hidden Children’s theory of mind and executive functioning were also measured.

A hierarchical logistic regression revealed a significant interaction between age and condition on decision making (λ2=73.78, p=.001), such that when verbal testimony was contradicted by nonverbal testimony, 6-year-olds were significantly more likely to choose the box indicated by the nonverbal testimony compared to 4-year-olds (OR=37.37, z=6.15, p<.001) and 5-year-olds (OR=20.47, z=5.92, p<.001). Both 4- and 5-year-olds chose to look in the verbally indicated box; there was no difference in the performance of these age groups. The predicted probability of choosing the box indicated by the nonverbal cues in the inconsistent videos was .13 for 4-year-olds, .13 for 5-year-olds, and .75 for 6-year-olds, illustrating dramatic improvement in children’s performance between ages 5 and 6. By 6, children seemed to acquire an understanding of the relation between verbal and nonverbal sources of information, such that inconsistencies between the two dimensions signaled deception and reduced trust. Indeed, explanation data revealed that only 6-year-olds made references to lying and trickery. These results were not explained by children’s theory of mind or executive functioning. This study provides exciting new evidence that the ability to detect deception through nonverbal cues emerges between 5 and 6 years of age, as children develop a more sophisticated understanding of the relation between verbal and nonverbal information in decisions of trust.

Authors

• Maliki E. Ghossainy, Boston University
  Presenting Author

• Jacqueline D Woolley, University of Texas at Austin
  Non-Presenting Author