The Role of Alternatives in Children’s Reasoning about Constrained Choices

• In Event: Advances in Social Cognition: Children’s Inferences in a Complex Social World

Abstract

To accurately infer others’ preferences from the choices they make, it is important to consider the constraints under which their choices were made. Prior research suggests that the capacity to consider constraints emerges by at least 5 years of age (Jara-Ettinger et al., 2015; Pesowski et al., 2016), such that children are less likely to infer a preference from a constrained choice compared to a less constrained choice. However, when constraints are stable and held constant over time—as they tend to be in society—constraints may lose their salience and children may misread constrained “choices” as informative of a true preference. The present study examined this hypothesis among children five to twelve years old.

Children (N = 133) were assigned to one of four between-subject conditions (see columns in Figure 1). On the test trial (i.e., the third trial), participants reasoned about a constraint in which the second toy option was out of reach (Hard to Reach) or there was no second option at all (No Other Option). Critically, we varied whether children were initially primed with an alternative choice structure in which the protagonists were unconstrained (Alternative Priming condition), or if constraints were held constant such that they only observed protagonists make constrained choices (No Alternative Priming condition). After each trial (including priming trials), children were asked if the protagonist likes the selected toy more than the unselected toy and to explain their answer. Children were coded as “considering constraints” if they (a) refrained from inferring a preference (e.g., saying “no” when asked if the protagonist prefers the selected toy), and (b) mentioned the constraint in their explanation (e.g., “Because she can’t reach the triangle toy”). Of central interest was whether children considered the constraint at test and if this varied across conditions.

Results indicated that, by 6.5 years of age, priming children with alternatives increased their consideration of the Hard to Reach constraint, but there was no priming effect for the No Second Option constraint (see Figure 2). We further explored the priming effect for the Hard to Reach constraint to discern whether the effect was being driven by children in the No Alternative Priming condition worsening across trials or if children in the Alternative Priming were more attuned to constraints. We found support for both explanations: Children in the No Alternative Priming condition considered constraints significantly less from the first to the third trial, and their consideration of constraints in the first trial was still significantly lower than children in the Alternative Priming condition at test. We also note, that across both constraint types, children’s age positively predicted their consideration of constraints.

Taken together, reminding children of structures in which there actually is a choice is crucial for them to consider certain constraints (Hard to Reach). But other types of constraints (No Other Option) may be more obvious once children are older. We will discuss the implications of these findings for when and why children discount constraints in the real world.

Authors

• Jamie Amemiya, University of California - San Diego
  Presenting Author

• Gail D Heyman, University of California - San Diego
  Non-Presenting Author

• Caren M. Walker, University of California - San Diego
  Non-Presenting Author