Exploring the intersection of mentalistic and normative frameworks in explanations of others’ behaviors

• In Event: Poster Session 02
  In Poster Session: PS 02 Topic - Social Cognition

Abstract

Young children construct frameworks to accomplish the critical task of explaining and predicting others’ behavior (Wellman, 2014). One important lens children interpret behavior through is the mental state framework (Miller & Aloise, 2017). This framework, while useful and prominent in the literature, rests on a rather narrow focus on individual internal mental states with little consideration of contextual factors that influence human behavior. An important alternative is the normative framework that extends beyond the individual and situates behavior within social contingencies, constructed on the premise that people are profoundly influenced by their social context and act in accordance with the norms of their social position (Lagattuta & Weller, 2014). As such, social group membership and normative constraints are relevant for predicting behavior (Hirschfeld, 2013).

A growing literature demonstrates that even very young children utilize a normative framework to interpret others’ actions. However, the relation between the internal mental state and normative frameworks remains an active topic of debate (Kalish, 2006; Hirschfeld, 2013; Wellman & Miller, 2008).

Method
Goal: Examine how children (ages 4, 7, and 10 with an adult comparison group; n = 132, 33/group) utilize mentalistic and normative frameworks when explaining others’ behavior.

Study 1: Using an open-ended paradigm, participants are presented with vignettes of peers carrying out various everyday behaviors and asked to explain why they acted the way they did (see Table1). Three categories of behavior are examined: norm-consistent, norm-inconsistent, and norm-irrelevant behaviors. Explanations are coded for references to mentalistic and normative frameworks, or a combination of the two.

Study 2: Using a forced-choice paradigm, participants are presented with two explanations for a series of norm-consistent behaviors and asked to select the best one (mentalistic, normative, combination; see Table2).

Hypotheses
1. For norm-consistent behavior, children are expected to generate/prefer explanations that appeal to a normative framework. In contrast, for norm-inconsistent and norm-irrelevant behavior, children are expected to generate explanations that appeal to a mentalistic framework.
2. Consistent with evidence that children increasingly rely on a mentalistic framework with age, older children and adults are expected to generate/prefer more mentalistic explanations than younger children.
3. To the extent that mentalistic and normative frameworks are interdependent (Wellman & Miller, 2008), and to the extent that the normative framework is inherently mentalistic (Kalish, 2006), explanations that appeal to both normative and mentalistic motivations should be generated/preferred over those appealing to norms alone.

The GEE procedure will be used to compare the likelihood of producing mentalistic/normative/combination explanations. Dependent samples t-tests will be used to compare the proportion of explanation types within each age group.

Most data had been collected and coded (n = 107) when our Covid-19 stay-at-home order went into effect this spring. We have now modified the studies to be run virtually and are resuming data collection. Collecting data for the remaining 25 participants and conducting analyses in advance of the meeting is feasible.

These studies are well-positioned to speak to important ongoing debates about the relative utility and independence of mentalistic and normative frameworks for reasoning about behavior.

Authors

• Wyntre Stout, Lehigh University
  Presenting Author

• Amanda C Brandone, Lehigh University
  Non-Presenting Author