A memory-based heuristic guiding children’s inferences of possibility

• In Event: Poster Session 06
  In Poster Session: PS 06 Topic - Cognitive Processes

Abstract

Young children often deny that improbable events can happen (Shtulman, 2009; Lane et al., 2016). For instance, most children would probably say that pet zebras and onion-flavored popsicles are not merely unlikely, but truly impossible. But the source of their skepticism towards strange and improbable events remains unclear.

In two experiments, we explore a strategy that 5-6-year-olds might use to decide whether improbable events can happen. Specifically, we ask whether young children infer the possibility of an event by searching their memory for known events that are similar to the event in question. We also test whether this memory-based strategy is constrained by children’s causal knowledge (Sobel, 2004).

In Experiment 1, we told 5-6-year-olds (N=80, Mage=6;0) improbable facts about people and then asked whether a different improbable event could also happen. Each fact was accompanied by a photo demonstrating that it was true, and children responded to six fact-event pairings. In the related-event condition, children heard facts related to the target event; for instance, children learned that a person had a pet elephant, and then judged whether a person could also have a pet zebra. In the unrelated-event condition, children heard facts unrelated to the target event; for instance, the pet zebra was instead paired with a fact about a striped plane. The unrelated-fact condition featured the same facts and events as the related-event condition, but with the pairings shuffled so that the facts and events were not related. However, this meant that children would inevitably judge the possibility of events related to facts presented in previous trials. We therefore blocked the items such that children’s first three judgments were unrelated to the presented facts, whereas their final three judgments were related to facts presented in the first three trials. We found that children’s responses in the first block were predicted by whether the fact was related or unrelated to the event: children who heard related facts more often judged that improbable events could happen, p<.001. In contrast, their responses in the second block did not differ across conditions, p=.849, as children had already learned facts related to the events (Figure 1)

In Experiment 2, we told 5-6-year-olds (N=50, Mage=6;1) improbable facts and then asked whether improbable events and impossible events could also happen. For instance, children learned that a person had a pet elephant and then judged whether a person could also have a pet zebra and pet unicorn. Children responded to four trials. Children mostly affirmed that improbable events could happen, ps < .013, and mostly denied that impossible events could happen, ps<.001 (Figure 2).

The findings show that children will more often affirm that improbable events can happen if they know that similar events have already occurred. This suggests that children rely on a memory-based heuristic for inferring possibility. However, children did not affirm impossible events even when they were related to a known event. This shows that children’s beliefs about possibility are further constrained by their causal knowledge (Schult & Wellman, 1997; Sobel, 2004).

Authors

• Brandon Wade Goulding, University of Winnipeg
  Presenting Author

• Ori Friedman, University of Waterloo
  Non-Presenting Author