Children's Understanding of the Value of Non-Obvious Testimony

• In Event: Poster Session 10
  In Poster Session: PS 10 Topic - Cognitive Processes

Abstract

One primary value of testimony lies in its ability to extend access to information beyond one’s own powers of observation. Preference for this type of testimony has been found with generic versus specific information. By age 7, children preferred speakers who provided generic statements (e.g. “Pangolins have scales”) over specific statements (e.g. “This pangolin has scales”) about a novel animal (Koenig et al., 2015). Here, we extend this research on children’s preferences for testimony that goes beyond observation by examining whether children attribute more knowledge to speakers who make claims that they can perceptually verify (obvious statements) versus speakers who make non-obvious statements about a novel animal.

One hundred and eighty children (M = 5;11, range = 3;0 — 8;11, 88 male) and twenty adults (M = 21;1, range = 18;5 – 34;3, 9 male) watched two informants make statements about a pangolin in a photograph across four trials. One informant consistently stated obvious facts about pangolins (e.g. “This pangolin is brown”), while the other informant consistently stated non-obvious facts about pangolins (e.g. “This pangolin eats insects”). Participants appraised the relative knowledge of each informant and were asked to generalize a speaker’s knowledge to other pangolins, other novel animals, and novel artifacts.

For analyses, we split child participants into two groups: those who attributed more knowledge to the non-obvious speaker or the obvious speaker on the majority of knowledge attribution trials (EJTs). Seven- and eight-year-olds attributed more knowledge to the non-obvious speaker over the obvious speaker than younger children (χ2(2) = 20.9, p < .001), who indicated no preference for either informant. Repeated binary logistic regressions analyzed children’s knowledge attributions as a function of generalization trial type, EJT group, age, and the interactions between these predictors (Table 1). Children who attributed more knowledge to the non-obvious speaker on EJTs generalized the non-obvious speaker’s knowledge to other pangolins beginning at age 5 (β = 1.468, z = 4.05, p < .001) and animal trials beginning at age 7 (β = 1.155, z = 3.14, p = .002), but never for artifacts (Table 2). In contrast, all adults attributed more knowledge to the non-obvious speaker on the majority of EJTs and generalized the non-obvious speaker’s knowledge to all three generalization types (pangolins: M = .94, SD = .11; t(19) = 17.62, p < .001), animals: (M = .81, SD = .16; t(19) = 8.75, p < .001), and artifacts (M = .75, SD = .28; t(19) = 3.98, p < .01).

As age increases, children attribute more knowledge to non-obvious speakers and generalize the non-obvious speaker’s knowledge to domains that the speaker would likely know about (pangolins and other animals). Adults, however, preferred non-obvious information for all generalization domains. These results suggest that by adulthood, there may be a heuristic judgment that privileges non-obvious information, which slowly emerges throughout childhood. As child listeners become increasingly knowledgeable about categories and topics in the natural world, they place increased value on non-obvious testimony when discerning knowledgeable from less-knowledgeable sources.

Authors

• Erika Rose DeAngelis, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities
  Presenting Author

• Katherine Ridge, University of Minnesota
  Non-Presenting Author

• Melissa A. Koenig, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities
  Non-Presenting Author