Epistemic Partisanship Through a Developmental Lens: A Precursor to Political Disagreement and Division

• In Event: When Children Navigate Misinformation and Disagreement, how far Does Evidence Matter?

Abstract

A salient feature of the United States’ current political climate is the deep polarization of Democrats vs. Republicans, which causes gridlock on many consequential issues. One contributor to this disagreement may be epistemic partisanship: the tendency to learn about the world in ways that favor one’s ingroup’s values even at the expense of truth and accuracy. Although partisanship is a central topic in the literature on adult political psychology, little is known about when and how it emerges across development. Thus, here we studied the developmental trajectory and underlying mechanisms of children’s epistemic partisanship.

In Study 1, 5- to 7-year-olds (N=98) were asked to decide between the claims of two cartoon children. Participants were assigned either to the Partisanship condition, where one of the two children on the screen belonged to the participant’s minimal ingroup (shared t-shirt color), or to the Control condition, in which groups were not mentioned. Across six trials, participants viewed three high-ambiguity hybrid images (e.g., a hybrid manipulated to look equally like a rabbit and a squirrel; Corriveau et al., 2009) and three low-ambiguity hybrids (e.g., a spoon/key hybrid that looked mostly like a spoon). The ingroup and outgroup always made opposing claims about the identity of these images. Critically, on the low-ambiguity trials, the ingroup member always gave the implausible identity. Older children in the Partisanship (vs. Control) condition were significantly more likely to endorse their ingroup’s claims, exhibiting epistemic partisanship (p=.002; Figure 1). This effect did not differ for high- vs. low-ambiguity trials. Younger children did not show partisanship (p=.75).

In Study 2, we explored the mechanisms underlying epistemic partisanship: Do children endorse their ingroup’s claims because they actually believe them, or simply to project support for their ingroup? We compared 6- to 9-year-olds’ (N=172) partisanship across three conditions embedded within Study 1’s task: (1) the No Incentive condition (identical to Study 1’s Partisanship condition), (2) a new Accuracy Incentive condition in which children were told that the more questions they answer correctly, the bigger the “special prize” they receive at the end will be, and (3) a new Partisanship Incentive condition in which children were told that the more questions their group answers correctly, the bigger the “special prize” their group receives at the end will be. Children’s partisanship did not differ between the Accuracy Incentive and No Incentive conditions (p=.50), suggesting that when children endorse their ingroup’s claims without incentive, they truly believe those claims (Figure 2). Further, children in the Partisanship Incentive condition displayed more partisanship than children in the Accuracy Incentive condition (p=.012) and marginally more than children in the No Incentive condition (p=.058), suggesting that an explicit motive to be partisan can increase children’s partisanship.

The present research illuminates the developmental trajectory of epistemic partisanship, showing that children exhibit partisanship from an early age and that partisanship “runs deep”: Children believe their ingroup’s claims, even at the expense of truth and accuracy. These studies lay the foundation for reconciling partisan disagreement and healing political divides.

Group Authors

N/A

Authors

• Natalie Ann Hutchins, New York University
  Presenting Author

• Bethany Lassetter, New York University

• Andrei Cimpian, New York University