Theory-of-mind Abilities at 4 Years Predict Experimentation Ability at 5 Years

• In Event: Factors Affecting Reasoning and Problem Solving in Children

Abstract

Although individual differences have been frequently observed in scientific reasoning, little is known about the developmental mechanisms in the early childhood years that give rise to these differences. Theory of mind is considered foundational to reason scientifically (Kuhn, 2010), and prior empirical work indicates a predictive relation between theory of mind and scientific reasoning (Koerber & Osterhaus, 2019; Piekny et al. 2013). Furthermore, studies show that general information-processing abilities (intelligence, language, executive function) play a role in the development of scientific reasoning (Koerber & Osterhaus, 2019; Piekny et al. 2013; van der Graaf et al., 2016, 2018). As a part of a bigger longitudinal study, we investigated the developmental relations of the theory of mind, language ability, and general intelligence at 4 years (T1) to experimentation ability at 5 years (T2). The final sample included 155 children (75 girls, 80 boys, T1 age: M=48.52 months, SD=1.53; T2 age M=64.99, SD=1.41). Theory of mind was measured with three theory-of-mind tasks, namely, knowledge access, content false belief, and explicit false belief (Wellman & Liu, 2004). The General Knowledge subtest of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (HAWIVA-III, German adaptation) was used as a measure of general intelligence. Language ability was measured with a standardized language test for German children (SETK 3-5, Grimm et al., 2015). For measuring experimentation ability, we used a shortened version of the ramp task, which was adapted for testing young children with multiple trials and feedback (van der Graaf et al., 2015). In this task, children are required to design contrastive and controlled experiments to test which factors (weight, slope, starting point) influence how far a ball rolls on a ramp. Intelligence, but not language ability at 4 years correlated with experimentation ability at 5 years. Furthermore, knowledge access and content false belief scores at 4 years, but not explicit false belief, correlated with experimentation ability at 5 years. We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis to investigate whether theory of mind at 4 years predicted experimentation ability at 5 years when intelligence was accounted for. Intelligence score was included in the first step, and knowledge access and content false belief measures were added in the second step of the regression analysis. The first model was significant; intelligence at 4 years was a significant predictor of experimentation ability at 5 years. The second model was significantly better than the first model in predicting experimentation: Knowledge access and content false belief remained significant predictors of experimentation ability when intelligence was accounted for. Our findings add to the current literature on the development of scientific thinking in showing that theory of mind understanding predicts experimentation ability, especially, understanding that having access to evidence is critical to knowledge formation and a change in evidence would not directly lead to a change in beliefs if a person did not have access to evidence. These findings are informative for understanding the nature of the development of early scientific reasoning and have implications for fostering scientific reasoning in the early childhood years.

Authors

• Özgün Köksal, LMU Munich
  Presenting Author

• Andrea Saffran, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

• Beate Sodian, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich