Chinese and U.S. Children’s Possibility Judgments

• In Event: How Children Judge the Possibility of Improbable and Impossible Events

Abstract

When thinking about whether a given action is possible, one can consider epistemic principles (i.e., given natural laws, is it physically possible) or deontic principles (i.e., given cultural constraints, is it permissible). Prevailing WEIRD ideas about the development of possibility conceptions suggest that an epistemic conception of possibility is the correct or most reflective conception of possibility: Adults default to more deontic judgments under time pressure, calling immoral but possible actions impossible (Phillips & Cushman, 2017), a mistake 4- to 7-year-old children frequently make (Phillips & Bloom, 2017). Shtulman and Phillips (2018) suggested that children’s ability to separate should from could is a developmental achievement. The ability to reason that if an event is physically possible it can happen, irrespective of any deontic cultural constraints, may well be a developmental achievement within WEIRD cultures. However, it is possible that children’s surrounding culture may place different weights on epistemic and deontic obligations, and what constitutes a developmental achievement in possibility conceptions may be culturally relative.

Individuals within cultures differing in relative independence and interdependence have been shown to hold distinct values, which may lead to differing possibility conceptions. While individuals within independent cultures tend to value self-expression, uniqueness, and autonomy, individuals within relatively interdependent cultures tend to value interconnectedness, fitting in, social responsibility, and group cohesion (Marcus & Kitayama, 1991). These values may predispose children in interdependent cultures to base possibility conceptions on deontic constraints, such as permissibility, morals, and norms. Of course, when thinking about possibility, an individual in any given country can think about both deontic and epistemic concerns; our suggestion is that cultural interdependence and independence may affect the relative weight placed on each.

The current research explores how growing up in an independent culture vs. an interdependent culture might affect children’s developing possibility conceptions. We asked 125 4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds from Austin, TX and Wuhan, China to judge the possibility of 15 ordinary, improbable, and impossible events. Cultural differences emerged in age-related development of children’s understanding of improbable events: while U.S. children became more likely to say these events were possible with age (replicating Shtulman & Carey (2007)), Chinese children saw no age-related changes: 4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds maintained that improbable events were impossible (Fig. 1). Computational text analysis of justifications (LIWC) revealed cultural differences in linguistic dimensions reflecting cognitive processing and all-or-nothing thinking. Results suggest that independent and interdependent cultural surroundings may differentially affect children’s developing possibility conceptions.

To further explore whether children from the U.S. and China differ in the extent to which they rely on epistemic and deontic considerations when making possibility judgments, we are currently asking 4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds whether ordinary, improbable, and impossible events would require magic (i.e., epistemic possibility) or result in someone getting in trouble (i.e., deontic possibility). Additionally, to explore whether independent and interdependent cultural orientations explain differences in possibility judgments, we are asking undergraduates from both countries to complete a measure of individual-level individualism/collectivism (Singelis, 1995) and judge the possibility of ordinary, impossible, and improbable events.

Authors

• Jenny Nissel, University of Texas at Austin
  Presenting Author

• Hui Li

• Jacqueline D Woolley, University of Texas at Austin