Poster #21 - Children’s Emotional Experiences Towards Controllable and Uncontrollable Counterfactuals

• In Event: Poster Session 14

Abstract

Counterfactual thinking involves imagining alternative outcomes to actual past events. When we consider counterfactual alternatives to actions that were within our own control, we often experience regret, which can help us learn to choose better actions in the future. Indeed, adults understand that if we want to make better future decisions it is more beneficial to consider controllable counterfactuals than uncontrollable counterfactuals (Frosch et al., 2015; Mercier et al., 2017). Although previous research suggests that children begin to counterfactually reason in similar ways to adults at around 6 years of age (Rafetseder & Perner, 2014), studies have yet to investigate if children feel stronger emotions towards controllable counterfactuals than uncontrollable counterfactuals.

In the current study, 4- to 9-year-old children (N = 192) were given 4 stickers and presented with two pairs of boxes, with each pair concealing one white ball and one black ball (see Figure 1). Children selected a box from one pair (i.e., a controllable outcome) and the experimenter spun a wheel to select a box from the other pair (i.e., an uncontrollable outcome). The contents of the boxes were then revealed, with the child winning 4 more stickers if the selected boxes concealed matching balls (winning condition) but losing 4 stickers if the selected boxes concealed non-matching balls (losing condition). We first measured children’s initial emotions about each selected box on a 7-point Likert scale of faces (ranging from extremely happy to extremely sad). Critically, children were then prompted to think about the counterfactual outcomes that would have occurred had each selected box concealed a different ball, and we measured which selected box children felt better about (when they won) or worse about (when they lost).

In both the winning and losing conditions, there was no significant difference between children’s initial emotions towards the child-selected and wheel-selected boxes, both F < 5.16, p > .056, p2 < .02. Consistent with a temporal order effect (Meehan & Byrne, 2005), however, children in the losing condition felt significantly sadder about the box selected second, regardless of how that box was selected, F (1, 187) = 7.07, p = .009, p2 = .04.

Following the counterfactual prompt, children in the winning condition felt significantly better about the box that was within their control than the box that was not, Wald 2 (1, N = 96) = 6.86, p = .009, w = 0.27, with no difference across ages, Wald 2 (1, N = 96) = 0.03, p = .862, w = 0.02 (see Figure 2). This effect may reflect children’s feelings of agency over winning, rather than counterfactual thinking per se. In the losing condition, by contrast, older children were more likely than younger children to feel worse about the box within their control than the box that was not, Wald 2 (1, N = 96) = 11.18, p < .001, w = 0.34 (see Figure 2). This effect suggests that, with increasing age, children may be more likely to consider the controllability of counterfactuals after experiencing a negative outcome.

Authors

• Alicia Jones, University of Queensland
  Presenting Author

• Shalini Gautam, Boston College

• Jonathan Redshaw, University of Queensland