Imagined Movie “Sequels” Show Changes in the Composition of Episodic Future Thought During Middle- to Late-Childhood

• In Event: The Development of Future-Thinking Across Childhood

Abstract

Episodic future thinking allows individuals to imagine personal future events by retrieving and recombining details from episodic memory. Imagined future events cannot be copies of remembered events—they must include novel elements. Prior research indicates that episodic future thinking and memory develop in concert. However, limited work has quantified whether children extend their memories to the same degree as adults when imagining the future. Here, we designed a new method (Figure 1A) to examine age-related differences in how imagination extends beyond remembered events. Participants ages 5-12 years and adults (N=78) watched a short movie. They then verbally recalled the movie (recall condition) and imagined a “sequel” for it (future-thinking condition). This task differs from traditional episodic future thinking tasks in that it is not autobiographical and does not involve discrete events. However, it allows for the assessment and control of relevant prior experience. Recall and sequel data were first coded for the number of episodic details they contained. Sequel episodic details were then further classified according to their relation with the original movie: identical to the original movie (an old detail taken directly from the movie), semantic (a new detail grounded in relevant semantic knowledge, but not directly related to the movie plot), derived (a new detail derived from—or a logical extension of—the movie plot), or random (a new and completely arbitrary detail).

A mixed-effects model found an age-related increase in the number of episodic details reported during both the recall and imagined sequel phases, though this increase was more protracted for recall (age*phase interaction: p=.002; Figure 1B). Participants who recalled more details also imagined more details in their movie sequel, regardless of age (p<.001), supporting a functional relation between memory and imagination. We next examined the degree to which the imagined details included in participants’ movie sequels reflected content that was derived, yet unique, from the original movie. A mixed-effects model found an interaction between age and detail type (age*detail type interaction: p=.002; Figure 1C). Imagined sequel details that were identical to the original movie increased gradually until late childhood (Adults > 5-9 year-olds; adolescents > 5-7 year-olds; ps<.012). Semantic details also increased until late childhood, though in a nonlinear manner; both adults (ps<.043) and 10-12 year-olds (ps<.078) tended to provide more semantic details than 5-9 year-olds. Notably, adults imagined derived details that were neither identical to the original movie nor grounded in semantic knowledge more than all child age groups (ps<.005), with no differences observed between the child age groups (ps>.113).

Findings replicate prior observations that episodic future thinking improves across childhood, while extending that work to show qualitative changes in the composition of children’s episodic future thoughts during middle- to late-childhood. Specifically, late developmental improvements may reflect an enhanced ability to construct novel future events—not merely re-casted past events—through the incorporation of derived knowledge.

Authors

• Christine A Coughlin, University of Texas at Austin
  Presenting Author

• Anthony Dutcher, The University of Texas at Austin

• Cameron E. Hall, University of Texas at Austin

• Jeanne J. Gentot, University of Texas at Austin

• Nicolette M. Notti, University of Texas at Austin

• Andrei Amatoni, University of Texas at Austin

• Alison Preston, University of Texas at Austin