Beyond One-Dimensional Evaluations: The Case for Complex Moral Judgments Across Development

• In Event: Developing Judgments about Moral Obligation

Abstract

It’s easy to imagine that moral judgments fall along a single, evaluative dimension (Crary, 2009). Indeed, most studies prompt children and adults to evaluate acts using ratings or dichotomous judgments that assume just such a unidimensional scale (e.g., good-bad; e.g., Gray & Graham, 2018). But everyday moral evaluations go beyond a single dimension of good-bad or right-wrong. People can also make complex evaluations that draw categorical distinctions among multiple kinds of good acts or among multiple kinds of bad acts. They separate obligatory from non-obligatory moral deeds, unforgivable from forgivable sins, and clear-cut violations from moral gray areas.

This presentation will discuss how complex moral evaluations (1) develop by preschool age, (2) are especially common in non-straightforward situations, and (3) shape responses to violations (e.g., punishment).

Study 1 interviewed preschoolers (N=52) and emerging adults (N=56) about straightforward and non-straightforward helping (e.g., addressing dire need at low cost vs. minor need at high cost). Participants were asked whether the protagonist should help and whether it would be okay to go against the participant’s judgment (e.g., refrain from helping when the participant recommended helping). Responses created two complex judgments, suberogatory (should not help, okay to help) and supererogatory (should help, okay to refrain, McNemara, 2011), and two simple judgments, prohibition (not okay to do) and obligation (not okay to refrain). As predicted, children made more complex judgments for non-straightforward (26%) than straightforward (10%) vignettes, p<.001. For non-straightforward situations, complex judgments increased with age, p=.018. Adults also provided more complex evaluations for non-straightforward (67%) than straightforward (41%) events, p<.001, and more complex judgments than children.

Study 2 used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to examine the multidimensionality of evaluations. Based on a pilot study, six evaluative labels assessed morality (e.g., “absolutely wrong”), wisdom (“foolish”), and complexity (“technically wrong, but I can see where they were coming from”). Young adults (N=98) rated their agreement with these labels concerning straightforward and ambiguous cheating (e.g., collaboration) on a 10-point scale. The PCA revealed a two-factor structure. As hypothesized, the second factor reflected the two complex labels and was higher in situations involving more ambiguous cheating, p<.001.

To examine how complex judgments inform actions, Study 3 analyzed emerging adults’ (N=149) evaluations and proposed punishments for possible sexual violations. We expected that more complex evaluation would predict milder punishments for violations. Participants read vignettes about straightforward (consensual/nonconsensual) or ambiguous events. Questions assessed simple (was the act okay?) and complex evaluations (e.g., protagonist is “probably a good person who didn’t realize what they were doing”). Again, participants provided more complex evaluations for ambiguous than straightforward events, p<.001. Even among acts that participants judged wrong, more complex evaluations were associated with milder punishment, ps<.001.

These findings suggest that complex moral evaluations—evaluations that go beyond a unidimensional dichotomy or rating scale—become increasingly common across development and that they shape responses to violations, such as views about punishment. By incorporating complex moral evaluations, research and theory on moral development may better account for real-life judgments and decisions.

Authors

• Audun Dahl, University of California - Santa Cruz
  Presenting Author

• Talia Waltzer, University of California - San Diego

• Arvid Samuelson, University of Maryland - College Park

• Rebekkah Lauren Gross

• Catherine Siefert

• Anjuli Corzine