Poster #74 - Does Cognitive Reflection Predict Children’s Gender Stereotyping and Essentialism?

• In Event: Poster Session 08

Abstract

Understanding the cognitive mechanisms that underlie the development and persistence of gender stereotyping and gender essentialism (e.g., viewing girls’ color preference for pink as an immutable inborn biological trait) is critical for addressing gender inequities and prejudice. Research with adults has highlighted intuitive vs. reflective thinking as a possible mechanism of stereotyping and essentialism. For example, adults with greater cognitive reflection, a measure of intuitive vs. reflective thinking, endorse fewer social stereotypes (Blanchar & Sparkman, 2020). And adults under cognitive demands (i.e., time pressure) essentialize gender more so than adults that have time to deliberate (Eidson & Coley, 2014). However, the relationship between intuitive vs. reflective thinking and children’s gender stereotyping and essentialism is poorly understood. In the current study, we examine whether cognitive reflection predicts children’s thinking about gender stereotypes, gender essentialism, and gender inequality.

U.S. children ages 5-12 years old (N = 50, study in progress) participated over Zoom. Children first completed measures of cognitive reflection, inhibitory control, cognitive flexibility, working memory, and fluid intelligence. Children then completed measures of gender stereotyping (a shortened activities scale from the COAT-AM; e.g., “Who should babysit? Only boys, only girls, or both boys and girls?”), gender essentialism (5 questions from Gülgöz et al., 2021; e.g., “Do you think Andrew can change whether or not he is a boy if he wants to? Yes, maybe, or no?”), and a novel measure of children’s explanations of gender inequality (adapted from Rizzo et al., 2021; see Figure 1).

Preliminary analyses suggest that children with greater cognitive reflection endorse fewer gender stereotypes (r = -.37), hold less essentialist beliefs about gender (r = -.33), and favor structural/external explanations of gender inequality over essentialist/internal explanations (r = .33). Notably, cognitive reflection continued to predict gender stereotyping and essentialism after controlling for age, gender, and the additional cognitive measures (Figure 2). Cognitive reflection did not predict children’s explanations of inequality above and beyond the control variables.

These preliminary findings suggest that variation in intuitive vs. reflective thinking may predict variation in children’s gender cognition. Results of this study will enhance our understanding of the cognitive foundations of children’s gender stereotyping and essentialism. Furthermore, this study may highlight cognitive reflection as a potential vehicle for reducing harmful gender stereotypes, bias, and prejudice.

Authors

• Michele Villacres, Northeastern Illinois University
  Presenting Author

• Caleigh Vanecek, Northeastern Illinois University

• Isaac Cortez, Northeastern Illinois University

• Bianca Michelle Vives, Northeastern Illinois University

• Samantha Andrea Macksey, Northeastern Illinois University

• Ruth Breckinridge Church, Northeastern Illinois University

• Andrew Young, Northeastern Illinois University