Poster #60 - “Will Sam Always have Autism?” : Children’s Essentialist Beliefs about Peers with Disabilities

• In Event: Poster Session 04

Abstract

Prior studies have examined children’s attitudes and behavior towards peers with disabilities (e.g., Bebetsos et al., 2014; Bunch & Valeo, 2004; de Boer et al., 2014; Post, 2014). In this project, we extend previous research by exploring children’s essentialist beliefs about people with disabilities. Psychological essentialism is an assumption about categories, which involves the expectation that members of a category (e.g., a person with a particular disability) share an underlying core/essence, resulting in them displaying stable group membership (always having the disability) and being alike (sharing the same traits; Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Marchak, 2019). It is important to examine whether children hold essentialist beliefs about people with disabilities, because they form the basis of stereotypes and may lead to the stigmatization of particular groups (Bogart et al., 2018).

Methods. In a pre-registered study, five- to 12-year-olds (n = 70 out of a planned sample of 100, mean age = 8.94 years) were presented with pictures of five individuals who were described as having a particular disability (e.g., “This is Sam. She has Autism”). We manipulated the types of disability presented within-subject: two visible disabilities (individual in a wheelchair, individual who is Blind), two invisible disabilities (individual with Autism, individual with dyslexia) and a control (individual with no disability). Participants were asked a series of questions to assess various components of essentialism: generalization, causality, stability and innateness (e.g., see Table 1 for a complete list of definitions and questions). Additionally, participants were asked to indicate whether they would be friends with the individual.

Results. Overall, we found that children did not systematically hold essentialist beliefs about people with disabilities (see Figure 1). However, there were systematic differences in how likely children were to endorse the different sub-components of essentialism. They expected that people with disabilities would remain members of the category over time and that their membership in the category would be determined at birth. In contrast, they did not systematically expect that a person’s traits (e.g., liking a certain activity) were caused by their disability or were shared with other people with the same disability. There were no significant differences between children’s essentialist beliefs about visible and invisible disabilities. Finally, we found no systematic differences in children’s friendship judgments across the five individuals.

Conclusion. Young children do not appear to hold strongly essentialist beliefs about people with disabilities. Further, they are willing to be friends with peers with disabilities. While our results show that children have a generally positive view of people with disabilities, future research will need to explore how these results generalize to other disabilities and also take into account how prior exposure to people with disabilities can influence children’s beliefs. The results have impacts on how we educate and intervene in children’s interactions with peers with disabilities inside and outside of the classroom.

Authors

• Sydney Mya Dickner, University of Alberta
  Presenting Author

• Sophie Elliott

• Kristan Marchak, University of Alberta