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Ethics and social studies of science would appear to have much in common, in particular given the rise of empirical ethics and what some describe as the “empirical turn” in bioethics. However, a closer look at current bioethics scholarship and the particular case of the recent field of neuroethics in North America reveals important divides. These divides fall along the lines of disciplinary orientations such as (1) more philosophy-oriented views of ethics scholarship; (2) more health-sciences oriented views; (3) and more social sciences-oriented views. The differences between these approaches are explainable by practical reasons, programmatic reasons, and theoretical reasons, notably ethics’ claimed special “normative” status. The latter is often interpreted, in philosophical ethics, as generating a number of epistemological and theoretical problems for the integration of empirical research. These problems include the fact-value distinction, the is-ought gap, and the naturalistic fallacy. These concerns take root in a deductive and abstract model of ethics where empirical research makes little if no sense. In this talk, I will describe some of the challenges encountered in my own interdisciplinary neuroethics research program which integrates empirical research. I will explore the kinds of promising answers that pragmatism offers based on a model of ethics that inherently connects empirical research on morality and normative ethics and criticizes what Dewey called the “spectator theory of knowledge”.