What is an Affordance?

• In Event: Postphenomenology - IV: Refining the Conceptual Framework

Abstract

The concept of “affordances” is important in STS approaches (broadly conceived) to technology. In these analyses, affordances often bear significant descriptive and explanatory weight. While there are debates about just what an affordance is, it remains a powerful concept in STS approaches, especially when describing our perceptual and practical engagement with technologies and the context in which they are found. Since postphenomenology likewise seeks to describe perceptual and practical engagement with technologies, one might expect to find many references to “affordance(s),” but they are rare. This is likely due to the fact that the concept originated from and remains embedded in social science approaches to technology, while postphenomenology emerges from phenomenology and pragmatism, thereby drawing on a different conceptual economy and methodology.

I believe that articulated in the right way, affordance(s)can become useful in postphenomenology as well. In this paper, I will seek to demonstrate this by examining the conceptual heritage of “affordances.” J.J. Gibson introduced “affordances” in his seminal work, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Gibson acknowledges that the concept was inspired by the work of early twentieth-century Gestalt psychologist. Merleau-Ponty’s account of perception likewise borrows much from Gestalt psychology. Given this common intellectual legacy, I suggest that the best way for a postphenomenologist to understand and integrate affordances into her descriptions and analyses is to look to Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation of Gestalt psychology along with his criticisms of it. Doing so can contribute to a postphenomenological account of affordances.

Author

• Kirk Besmer, Gonzaga University