Scoundrels or Stars? Theory and Evidence on the Use of Online Laborers in Accounting Research

• In Event: Use of Online Laborers and Control Systems Research

Abstract

Online labor markets give researchers the ability to recruit large numbers of diverse participants who are willing to work for low wages. However, uncertainty about these workers’ honesty and willingness to exert effort calls into question whether they are reasonable proxies for populations of interest in accounting research. We select two accounting studies that examine the constructs of honesty and effort to compare online workers’ decisions to those in prior literature. We find that workers in online labor markets exhibit honesty preferences similar to those of participants in Evans et al. (2001). We also find that workers in online labor markets exert effort at least equal to, and sometimes greater than, participants in Farrell et al. (2008), and these effort levels are sustained even when pay is a flat wage that is significantly smaller than the average wage in prior research. Further, online workers’ efforts are only sensitive to differences in performance-based pay schemes when pay is relatively low. Our findings provide insights to accounting researchers considering the use of online labor markets for inexpensive and fast data collection.

Authors

• Anne M Farrell, Miami University

• Jonathan H Grenier, Miami University

• Justin Leiby, University of Florida