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Multiple tasks may provide different opportunities for self-interested behavior. This study investigates how the opportunity to misreport on a first task affects shirking behavior on a second task. Additionally, we investigate how formal controls affect this spillover of opportunism. In an experimental investigation, we vary the opportunity to misreport on a first task (absent vs. present). Nested within an opportunity to misreport, we further manipulate the strengths of controls for a first task (no, weak, strong). We find that an opportunity to misreport on the first task significantly increases shirking behavior on a subsequent task, regardless of the strengths of controls. We argue that the opportunity to misreport enables mechanisms of moral disengagement and ethical fading such that individuals are more willing to engage in self-interested behavior on the second task. Even if strong controls prevent actual lying, the economic frame established by the controls still leads to increased shirking behavior. Overall, our study informs accountants about the consequences of misreporting and the effects of formal controls.
Christian Bruck, Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Thorsten Knauer, Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum
Anja Christiane Schwering, Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum