Using an abstract, experimental economics study with interaction between auditor and inspector-type participants, we examine how regulatory pressure and auditors’ mindsets affect audit procedure choice selections. We predict and find that auditor procedure choice quality (i.e., selecting the most appropriate available procedure) is highest when regulatory pressure is moderate, but deteriorates when pressure is too high or too low, consistent with an inverted-U shape relationship between pressure and procedure choice quality. This effect is moderated by the auditor’s mindset, such that auditors with a deliberative mindset follow this pattern while those with an implemental mindset maintain lower procedure choice quality regardless of the level of pressure. Our paper informs debate in the literature on how regulatory pressure affects audit procedure choice and adds to our understanding of how mindsets affect auditor judgments at the planning stage of the audit. Given the emerging role of new audit technology, it is important to understand what factors affect audit procedure choice and what can hinder the adoption of new approaches.