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Accounting estimates, including those related to fair value, are pervasive in financial reports and are often subject to managerial manipulation. Financial statement audits are conventionally viewed as a deterrent to such manipulation. In an experiment with 127 accounting professionals averaging over 28 years of experience, we test whether the opposite is true for financial reporting choices related to fair value estimates. We show that participants in the role of a CFO “start high” with their fair value estimates when anticipating an audit, as they view the audit as likely to cause downward revisions to their estimates. We also find that managers’ tendency to “start high” is more pronounced when past auditor-manager negotiation outcomes have favored the auditor’s, versus the manager’s, preferred reporting position. Finally, we find that although managers do not proactively respond to auditor expertise in their initial estimates, they expect expert auditors to prompt lower final reporting outcomes.