Search
Program Calendar
Browse By Day
Search Tips
Conference
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Location
About AAA
Personal Schedule
Sign In
The SEC provides companies with considerable flexibility in the disclosure of the ratio between CEO and median employee compensation (pay-ratio). Using an experiment, I find that providing information about CEO and other highly paid executives’ education and experience (additional information) in the pay-ratio disclosure increases nonprofessional investors’ support for executive compensation (SoP). Drawing on research in psychology, I predict that additional information increases investors’ perceptions of meritocracy especially when the pay-ratio is higher than the industry benchmark which helps investors rationalize the compensation gap made salient by the pay-ratio. I find that investors’ perceptions of meritocracy positively influence their SoP support. Finally, I find that SoP support is positively related to investors’ investment decisions. My findings provide evidence that the content of the pay-ratio disclosure apart from the disclosure itself could systematically affect investor decisions.