Auditors and the Principal-Principal Agency Conflict in Family-Controlled Firms

• In Event: Risk and Audit Fees

Abstract

This paper investigates whether auditors are sensitive to the extant of the principal-principal agency conflict within the context of French family-controlled firms. We examine the impact of control competition between the largest controlling shareholder (LCS) and multiple large shareholders (MLS) on audit fees. Using a hand-collected sample of 1,483 firm-year observations over the period 2003-2010, our results show that a LCS’s excess control, as measured by the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights, translates into higher audit fees. This findings is consistent with auditors charging high audit fees for firms with high minority expropriation threat by LCS. We find also that audit fees decrease with the presence, number and voting power of MLS evidencing that multiple large shareholders play an important monitoring role and can be viewed as an additional protection against abuses of the largest controlling shareholders.

Authors

• Sabri Boubaker, Groupe ESC Troyes en Champagne

• Michel L. Magnan, Concordia University