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We examine whether financial reporting regulation promotes arm’s length contracting. Exploiting discontinuous regulatory reporting requirements assigned to small and medium-sized private firms, we find that more extensive financial reporting requirements increase the public availability of firms’ financial information, banks’ reliance on such public information, and the degree of arm’s length contracting between firms and banks. In particular, we find that financial reporting facilitates contracting with multiple banks, at greater geographical and hierarchical distances, and at shorter maturities. While the average treatment effect on arm’s length contracting is modest, the regulatory effect is economically meaningful in districts with concentrated credit markets. Our results suggest that financial reporting regulation fosters arm’s length credit competition by reducing informational and spatial barriers to local credit markets.
Matthias Breuer, University of Chicago
Katharina Hombach, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich
Maximilian Andre Müller, WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management