Holding City Officials Accountable: The Impact of Electoral Control on Cities’ Audit Performance

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Abstract

Electoral control allows voters to hold public officials accountable for their actions by rewarding those who perform satisfactorily with reelection and removing from office those who do not perform adequately. Because officials are aware of voters’ control, they have been shown to perform better – this consequence is known as the “accountability effect.” This accountability effect has been shown to positively impact elected officials’ job performance and productivity, as well as the officials’ propensity to participate in corrupt activities.

The objective of this study is to determine if electoral control, measured by holding regular elections for City Council members and the Finance official, impacts a city’s audit performance. Results of this study indicate that electoral control is positively correlated with audit performance, suggesting that the scope of activities affected by electoral control is broader than previously thought and now includes financial management practices.

Author

• Amanda Peterson, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey