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Prior research and articles in the business press have documented evidence of high levels of misreporting among nonprofits. In particular, many nonprofits misreport or misclassify expenses to inflate the proportion of their mission-related program expenses to total expenses (i.e., program ratio) to appear more efficient and effective to charity rating agencies and donors. While prior research has primarily focused on documenting how nonprofits misreport, the purpose of our study is to examine why nonprofits misreport and how it can be potentially curtailed in practice. In particular, we propose that the relatively low fixed pay offered by nonprofit organizations contributes to the high level of misreporting. First, we posit that relatively low fixed pay attracts mission-driven managers who are willing to misreport despite their limited economic incentives for misreporting. Second, we posit that relatively low fixed pay increases donors’ trust of the nonprofit managers and give them greater opportunity to misreport. We plan to test our predictions by conducting two linked studies on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) online labor market platform. In recent years, the wage levels of nonprofit managers have been rising rapidly and are catching up to those in the private sector. Our prediction suggests an unidentified positive consequence of the rising wage levels in the nonprofit sector is that it could reduce the level of misreporting by nonprofit managers. Our paper can also contribute to the nonprofit misreporting literature and the employee sorting literature.