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Prior studies on agency theory suggest that agency problems exist in both for-profit organizations and nonprofit organizations. CEO compensation is associated with agency problems in nonprofit organizations (Core, Guay, and Verdi 2006). Aggarwal, Evans, and Nanda (2012) found evidence that board size is negatively associated with pay-to-performance sensitivity for nonprofit organizations. However, since donors are fund providers of nonprofit organizations, it is also likely that donors have strong incentives to carry out the monitoring role externally. The monitoring role of donors is limited to the donors’ ability to acquire nonprofit organization information, but charity rating agencies make the information more accessible and understandable. Given that prior research find that donors dislike high CEO compensation (Balsam and Harris 2014), this study focuses on whether charity rating availability is associated with negative pay-to-performance sensitivity. Using a sample derived from e-filed IRS Form 990s and Charity Navigator rating records, this study provides evidence that rating availability is negatively related to pay-to-performance sensitivity for nonprofit organizations. Additional tests provide evidence that the overall rating score and financial rating score are negatively associated with pay-to-performance sensitivity.