The Dark Side of Money: Financial Incentives Increase Dysfunctional Knowledge Sharing

• In Event: Knowledge Sharing, Data Exchange and Human Judgment
  In IS Paper Session: Knowledge Sharing, Data Exchange, and Human Judgment

Abstract

We extend neo-classical economic theory (NCET) to investigate whether, and how, financial incentives may increase two forms of dysfunctional knowledge sharing (KS): (1) harmful and (2) masked, i.e., organizationally useless. Results from samples of accounting professionals (n = 405) and interns (n = 272) indicate that, consistent with the predictions, financial incentives increase both forms of self-reported, dysfunctional KS. Structural equation model results indicate that both professionals’ and interns’ motivation for financial rewards fully mediates the effect of financial incentives on dysfunctional KS. Hence, the results suggest that, in settings where financial incentives for KS primarily increase the desire for financial reward, their effects are likely deleterious, and more negative among lower than higher knowledge professionals. The results help explain the complex, “Janusian”, i.e., two-faced – simultaneously positive and negative – effects of incentives on organizational outcomes, including KS.

Authors

• Ronald Cameron Cockrell, University of North Texas

• Dan Stone, University of Kentucky

• Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University