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In a natural experiment setting, this paper shows that a higher level of non-financial disclosure influences firms’ cost of equity capital. I use a notable feature of the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), which separates the patent publication date from its grant or issue date. Using this feature as an exogenous shock, it is posited that patent disclosure choice in the patent application is a form of non-financial disclosure, which influences firms’ information environment by signaling firm’s proprietary information. Consistent with extant disclosure literature, this study finds that early patent disclosure around the exogenous shock of regulatory change is associated with reduction in implied cost of equity capital.
In light of scant prior literature on timing of patent disclosure, this paper offers empirical evidence that benefits of early patent disclosure outweigh the costs. This is the case even after adjusting for a real option to delay inherent in the AIPA. This paper provides new evidence on the timing of proprietary disclosure that is of practical significance and importance to investors, policy makers, and regulators.