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Using an agency theory framework, we examine the e§ect of managerial overconÖdence on
the interaction between planning and control problems. We consider a typical setting in which
a manager makes an investment decision involving project selection and a production decision
to implement the chosen project. Thus, adverse selection and moral hazard problems a§ect
di§erent facets of management decision making, which allows us to examine how overconÖdence
a§ects the interaction between adverse selection and moral hazard. We show that overall welfare implications depend on the kind of overconÖdence: productivity-related or state-related.
When the agent overestimates the productivity of his e§ort, the principal can actually exploit
the overconÖdence and induce him to provide more e§ort at lower cost. However, overconÖdence can either exacerbate an existing overinvestment problem or it can mitigate an existing
underinvestment problem. We show that productivity-related overconÖdence unequivocally improves the principalís welfare. On the contrary, state-related overconÖdence aggravates the e§ort
incentive problem but can ameliorate the underinvestment problem. Overall, state-related overconÖdence decreases investor welfare, consistent with the negative connotation we often ascribe
to overconÖdence.