Search
Program Calendar
Browse By Day
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Theme
Personal Schedule
Sign In
We document the effects of bank holding company (BHC) requirements on corporate control. We find that distribution of BHC equity ownership shows a larger discontinuity at the 10% ownership level compared to non-financial firms. This result is consistent with a binding constraint arising from “presumption of control” by bank regulators for holders of more than 10% of BHC stock. Consistent with constraints on outside equity control, we find that underperformance of bank shares prior to large stock acquisitions by active investors occurs over a longer interval prior to the 13F filing. Additionally, underperformance of bank shares prior to CEO turnover is significantly worse. These results suggest that regulations constrain corporate-control changes for banks. Our results are consistent with the existence of frictions that increase entrenchment of bank managers. These restriction could increase the cost of non-controlling bank equity ownership.
Yadav K Gopalan, Washington University in St. Louis
Joshua Alan Lee, Florida State University
Richard Frankel, Washington University in St. Louis