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We examine whether CEO appearance affects CEO compensation and firms’ performance. Using the facial analyzing tools, we calculate the facial attractiveness score for a sample of S&P 500 CEOs based on their facial geometry. Since attractive CEOs tend to impress the board, we hypothesize that good-looking CEOs are more likely to receive a more favorable compensation package. We find that the facial attractiveness scores for CEOs are positively related to fixed salaries but unrelated to incentive pays. Although better paid in non-performance base salaries, good-looking CEOs do not outperform their plain-looking counterparts. We conduct three additional tests on the effect of CEO appearance on firms’ performance. First, we find that CEO appearance is unrelated to firms’ operating performance measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. Second, we find that CEO appearance is unrelated to firms’ accounting performance measured by discretionary accruals and financial restatements. Third, we find that CEO appearance is unrelated to firms’ social performance measured by corporate social responsibility scores. Overall, our findings that CEO appearance impresses but does not deliver add a new dimension to the extant literature on CEO attributes.