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In a behavioral experiment, I find evidence that middle managers are biased (1) against reporting subordinate knowledge to upper management when that knowledge disconfirms the firm’s strategy (i.e. disconfirming specific knowledge). I also find evidence that middle managers are biased (2) toward giving less positive performance evaluations to subordinates who provide that disconfirming specific knowledge. This double-bias is likely to limit what disconfirming specific knowledge reaches upper management, thereby limiting upper management’s ability to revise the firm’s strategy accordingly. In short, it supports formation of an echo chamber full of “yes men” who primarily tell upper management good news about the firm’s chosen strategy. I then find evidence that middle managers who receive a strategy map are less biased against reporting disconfirming specific knowledge to upper management. But I find no evidence of a strategy map effect on middle managers’ tendency to give less positive performance evaluations to subordinates who provide disconfirming specific knowledge.