Environmental Participation in the Shadow of the Chinese State

• In Event: New Patterns of China’s Environmental Governance

Abstract

Previous works argue ineffective environmental bureaucracy and weak (or constrained) civil society have contributed to China’s environmental crisis (Economy, Tilt, Wilson, Xie). China’s environmental governance reforms are simultaneously strengthening state enforcement measures and encouraging citizen participation in monitoring and enforcement processes. State control over environmental protection and citizen participation appear to be in tension with one another, especially as Chinese officials reluctantly relinquish control over governance to civil society groups that are not affiliated to the state. In discussing environmental governance under democracies, Borzel and Riesse (2010), however, theorize that opportunities for citizen participation increase as a state increases its enforcement capacity, at least until the state becomes very strong. Do China’s reforms, which strengthen state enforcement capacity, enhance or diminish citizen participation in environmental governance? To explore this question, the present paper analyzes changes in the regulatory field that have strengthened state capacity to enforce environmental law, and two aspects of citizen participation: civil society monitoring of polluters and participation in environmental public interest lawsuits. The early evidence on citizen participation since the revised Environmental Protection Law took effect on January 1, 2015, are mixed. Civil society organizations have been allowed to serve as plaintiffs in a small number of high-profile environmental public interest lawsuits, but that domain remains dominated by state-backed organizations and local procuratorates. Finally, in reaction to the threat of new fines and penalties on illegal emissions, some grassroots civil society organizations are finding new opportunities to advise and monitor polluters.

Author

• Scott Wilson, University of the South