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Thailand has had yet another coup d’état in May 2014, the 19th coup attempt since the country became a constitutional monarchy. The military hardliners are back, and this time they do not want to make the same mistakes their predecessors did following the 2006 coup. Coups are, by most measures, out of fashion in the 21st century, but they linger on as several developing countries around the world continue to experience military overthrows (i.e. Egypt, Fiji, Bangladesh). This paper provides a theoretical discussion of military coups as an instrument of institutional engineering in a developing democracy. I argue that there emerges a new type of regime transition, the “consented coup,” whereby coups are launched conditional upon significant perceived public support. Such consented coups are not meant to resolve political deadlock, but rather to legitimize different sets of actors in the political arena. Because coups cannot longer be launched without prior public support, the consented coup is designed to set a stage for the legitimization of future military takeovers. The inter-coup period in Thailand, from 2006 to 2014, will be used to demonstrate the logic and conditions for a consented coup. This new type of coup is particularly dangerous for developing democracies because they weaken the very foundations on which democracies can strive and consolidate.