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After three decades of market reform, while China has achieved rapid economic growth, it has also endured tense state-societal relations. The latter is evidenced in the hundreds of thousands of grassroots demonstrations staged by protestors from all stripes throughout the country. By way of a political economy approach, this paper attempts to shed light on some stylized facts related to social resistance since the launch of market reform in the 1980s. Farmer-peasants resisted heavy tax and fee burdens during the 1980s and 1990s. Laid-off workers sought unpaid wages and pensions after the state-owned enterprise reform in the 1990s. Migrant workers frequently go on strikes to demand unpaid wages, and higher salaries. Rural landholders stridently mobilize to protect their interests in lands and homes.
Why are farmer-peasants, laid-off workers, migrant workers, and rural landholders, the key aggrieved groups in social resistance? Why do these diverse groups of people all seek redress of similar economic grievances? This paper argues that decentralization of economic and administrative powers, which have been implemented in tandem with market reforms, have led to increased local government predation. Decentralization has worsened principal-agent problem between the central and local governments. While providing powers to local governments to pursue economic growth, the central government cannot effectively monitor local officials’ behavior. This is an inevitable consequence of authoritarian capitalism, or market reform without political liberalization that creates effective checks on behavior of economic agents.