Epistemic Beliefs and the Illusion of Explanatory Depth

• In Event: Conceptual and Methodological Issues and Advances in Research on Epistemic Beliefs

Abstract

Objectives and Theoretical Framework
The current study addresses the relationship between metacognition and epistemic beliefs. This relationship is critical for epistemic beliefs about sources and justification of knowledge: The probability of relying on external sources (vs. personal experience) may be inversely related to metacognitive judgments about one’s knowledge. The current study explores this relationship.
Rozenblit and Keil (2002) have shown that children as well as adults overestimate their own knowledge about complex systems (technical devices as well as natural phenomena) but when asked to give causal explanations, their metacognitive judgments drop systematically – an effect coined the “illusion of explanatory depth” (IOED). The current study explores how epistemic beliefs are related to the IOED. We test whether they are related to (1) the initial judgments and (2) the adjustment, namely, drops between judgments.
Method and Materials
Students (N = 60) answered online-questionnaires about their epistemic beliefs (Hofer, 2000; Stahl & Bromme, 2007). Then they answered questionnaires about toasters, helicopters, X-ray machines, and rainbows: For the IOED they gave Metacognitive Judgments (MK) about their own knowledge at three points of time (T1, T2, and T3). Between T1 and T2 they generated causal explanations, for example about how a toaster works. Between T2 and T3 they answered more specific questions.
Results and Conclusions
A repeated-measure MANOVA of the MKs regarding all phenomena showed a significant multivariate effect of time, which was univariately significant for toaster (F (2,118) = 40.56, p < .001, ƞp2 = .41) and rainbow (F (2,118) = 35.16, p < .001, ƞp2 = .37), with significant drops from T1 to T2 (= drop 1) and from T2 to T3 (= drop 2). Thus, we partly replicated the IOED effect.
Correlations between epistemic beliefs and (1) students’ initial MKs and (2) students’ drops in MKs show consistent results for rainbows: Strong beliefs in personal experience as justification for knowledge were associated with high MKs at T1 (r = .34, p = .008) and with high drops 1 (r = .34, p = .008). Additionally, questioning authorities (source of knowledge) was associated with high drops 2 (r = .32, p = .012). These results show that epistemic beliefs are related to initial metacognitive judgments as well as to the flexibility of their adjustments.
Significance and Implications
The core dimensions of sources and justification were significantly related to the IOED. Those who believe in personal experience as a valid source for knowledge are more susceptible to an initial overestimation of their own knowledge and therefore might not consult experts even if needed. However, the same persons also flexibly adjust their judgments when confronted with their lack of knowledge. This calls for more such experiences in educational contexts and indicates on a conceptual level that epistemic beliefs are indeed relevant for judgments about one’s own knowledge. These results also contribute to the recent debate about using testimony from others as a way of coping with the division of cognitive labor. Additionally, these results contribute to the current debate regarding the nature of sophistication.

Authors

• Stephanie Pieschl, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster

• Gerrit Hirschfeld, University of Münster

• Rainer F. Bromme, University of Münster