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In 2011 Presenter 1 proposed a model of spontaneous cognitive flexibility that attempts to explain why some individuals automatically engage in flexible thinking. In this hypothetical model, cognitive flexibility is described as the ability to adapt because individuals are constantly assessing if there is a need for change. If change is needed, then alternative changes are considered. If a change is made, one evaluates the appropriateness of the changes. Finally, it is assumed that the change is not necessarily permanent. The model further suggests that epistemically-related beliefs contribute to individuals’ cognitive flexibility. For example, beliefs in separate knowing (playing the devil’s advocate), connected knowing (taking on others’ perspectives), complex knowledge, (knowledge is composed of complex interrelationships among ideas) and tentative knowledge can contribute to the anticipation for the need for change, and the search for multiple options for change. Findings from two recent studies will be presented that show clear links between beliefs separate knowing, connected knowing, speed of learning, complex knowledge to cognitive flexibility. Cognitive flexibility mediated the effect of these beliefs on cognition. This same array of epistemically-related beliefs has been linked to openness to diversity, willingness to argue, and deep processing study habits. It will then be proposed that teaching of cognitive flexibility can demonstrate the integrative effects of epistemically-related beliefs cognition.