Search
Program Calendar
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Room
Browse By Unit
Browse By Session Type
Browse By Descriptor
Search Tips
Annual Meeting Housing and Travel
Personal Schedule
Sign In
X (Twitter)
In the application of Critical Race Theory, Carbado and Gulati (2003) have explored the tension between individual versus institutional, or group, interests. In their examination of the perceived tensions between the discipline of law and economics and Critical Race Theory, Carbado and Gulati underscore the importance of localizing analyses and critiques not just at a personal/individual level but also at a structural/institutional level. They argue that critical race structural/institutional critiques “help to elucidate the complex ways in which race operates…” (Carbado & Gulati, 2003, p. 1765). The purpose of this paper is to apply Carbado and Gulati’s analysis to the examination of interest convergence in the “post-racial” policy era. I posit that situating and contextualizing instances of interest convergence through both an individual and institutional interests lens adds texture and potency to Bell’s original thesis, while also showcasing that at its core, Bell’s theory is about power.
Building on Bell’s work, as well as the adaptations to Bell’s original doctrine by Dudziak (1988; 2000), Guinier (2004), and Carbado and Gulati (2003) among others, I introduce the concept of the “power preservation principle” as a contemporary outgrowth of Bell’s theory. The power preservation principle (PPP) posits that whereas institutionally led interest convergences have historically facilitated the advancement of “racial remedies,” under the guise of societal interests, times have changes. Bell’s original thesis of interest convergence, introduced just two years after the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), reflects a very different higher education landscape than today. In the twenty-first century, in the wake of an increasingly multicultural nation state where access to fountains of power, such as selective postsecondary institutions, are ever more competitive and constricted, the individual right to accessing such purveyors of power is more outwardly defended and contested by its historically white clientele. Through the power preservation principle individual interests and beliefs of perceived entitlement rights supersede institutional or societal pursuits; such actions lead to challenging and retrenching the continuance of race-conscious social and educational policy. I offer Fisher v. U.T. Austin as a prime example of the power preservation principle in the twenty-first century.