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Due to limited public-sector funding, low-income countries have turned to low-fee private schools (LFPSs) as a promising strategy for extending access to education, but especially to students located in slums, where governments often do not provide schools (Heyneman, Stern, & Smith, 2011). Research has begun to emerge in response to this trend (Day Ashley et al., 2015; Srivastava, 2013), but there are still significant gaps. One gap relates to LFPSs in the Philippines, where 9 percent of secondary students attend a private high school, thanks to the government’s Education Service Contracting (ESC) program, which offers to “poor but deserving” students a voucher that provides 55 percent of the cost of an average private school (Baum, 2011). This paper’s general objective is to highlight two important-yet-ignored aspects of this program: (a) the strategic, supply-side activity of LFPSs as they have entered the market to take advantage of this voucher program and (b) the demand-side rationalities that guide parental decision-making, particularly in marginalized contexts.
Theoretically, we draw on sociological approaches to understanding supply- and demand-side dynamics in local education spaces (Ball 2002; van Zanten, 2009) and the ways they can constitute “lived markets” (Taylor, 2009). These approaches underscore that market strategies and school choice processes are complex and iterative, with embedded rationalities guided not only by policy stipulations but also by the interaction of material and socially-constructed factors.
Methodologically, the results are based on a case study with two rounds of data collection (October 2015, January-February 2016) in one slum area of Manila chosen for its population density and LFPS prevalence. Data collection entailed interviews with 23 principals, 63 teachers, and 96 parents from both LFPSs (n=5) and nearby public schools (n=10) as well as a review of policy documents and interviews with relevant government officials.
Supply-side findings detail that LFPSs are dependent on public funding (ESC voucher), but also that LFPSs rely on additional student fees, which they are able to extract through “cream-skimming” lower middle-class students during admission. Put differently, social proximity factors are key because students gain admission when parents work at the school and because LFPSs target relatively more affluent students. Choice restriction to more expensive LFPSs is exacerbated because many LFPSs do not apply for ESC eligibility (because they do not have the requisite information) or because LFPSs fail government review (due to increasingly high requirements). On the demand-side, parents prefer public schools (perceived as higher quality), but with insufficient supply in the slum, the decision factors of (especially low SES) parents relate to cost, safety, social and geographic proximity, and curriculum focus. Because slum families cannot afford any LFPS without the ESC voucher, this program has serious implications for marginalized students, who dropout without it.
This study is valuable because it is the first to examine how LFPSs interact with a voucher policy, because it provides new insights into the functioning and limitations of local education markets in a marginalized context, and because it considers the implications of this increasingly-popular trend (i.e., LFPSs) for marginalized parents.
D. Brent Edwards Jr., University of Hawaii - Manoa
Andreu Termes
Antoni Verger, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona