Rethinking Curiosity

• In Event: Policing Curiosity: An Educational Crisis

Abstract

In this ppaer, I will trouble three assumptions about curiosity found in educational philosophy. First, Paulo Freire argues that curiosity is epistemological, meaning it concerns how we think about our lived experience. I would like to suggest that instead of epistemological, curiosity is instead embodied—it concerns what we can see, feel, taste, touch, and so forth. Second, curiosity is often thought of as a form of attention. It is some kind of experience that involves focusing on an experience. Yet I would like to contend that curiosity is first and foremost a moment of distraction, or a pulling away from what is of primary concern in order to experience the periphery or the margin. Third, curiosity is often thought of as an active, willed decision. For instance, if one is curious about something, then one pursues it. Yet, what I would like to argue is that the initial sensation of curiosity is not willed at all, but rather is a willingness to passively yield to something that strikes one’s perception. This might pose a challenge to the will, but it should not be confused with the will as such. In short, I will call for a new appreciation of the more or less underappreciated aspects of curiosity (including its embodied, distracted, and passive aspects) as educationally relevant.

Author

• Tyson E. Lewis, University of North Texas